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   The	  responses	  of	  individual	  states	  to	  the	  2009	  H1N1	  Pandemic	  are	  documented	  in	  their	  
After	  Action	  Reports	  (AARs),	  written	  in	  summer	  2010.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  understand	  how	  these	  
responses	  could	  improve	  for	  future	  pandemics,	  this	  paper	  reviews	  the	  AARs	  of	  fourteen	  states	  
to	  determine	  how	  vaccine	  distribution	  methods	  and	  communication	  issues	  impacted	  the	  
success	  of	  the	  states’	  responses	  to	  the	  2009	  H1N1	  Pandemic.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  review	  reveal	  
several	  trends	  to	  inform	  preparation	  for	  future	  pandemics.	  For	  instance,	  the	  best	  distribution	  
method	  for	  times	  of	  low	  supply	  of	  vaccine	  and	  high	  demand	  is	  one	  based	  on	  county	  populations	  
within	  a	  state,	  while	  an	  online	  ordering	  system	  for	  vaccine	  performs	  well	  in	  times	  of	  high	  supply	  
and	  lower	  demand.	  Finally,	  this	  paper	  finds	  that	  the	  best	  preparedness	  plans	  are	  the	  ones	  for	  




	   Two	  years	  ago,	  a	  novel	  virus	  made	  headlines	  in	  the	  United	  States:	  influenza	  infections	  
were	  spreading	  rapidly	  across	  Mexico	  and	  proving	  deadlier	  than	  the	  typical	  seasonal	  flu.	  When	  
similar	  cases	  began	  to	  appear	  within	  America’s	  borders,	  the	  United	  States	  government,	  under	  
the	  direction	  of	  the	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  Prevention	  (CDC),	  reacted	  decisively	  to	  
combat	  the	  impending	  pandemic.1	  The	  cause	  of	  the	  influenza,	  a	  novel	  H1N1	  virus,	  was	  quickly	  
identified,	  and	  in	  April	  2009	  four	  large	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  were	  contracted	  to	  begin	  
producing	  a	  vaccine	  to	  combat	  this	  disease.2	  By	  that	  fall,	  the	  second	  wave	  of	  H1N1	  had	  begun.	  
Citizens	  looked	  to	  the	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  for	  the	  vaccine,	  but	  due	  to	  a	  lengthy	  
production	  process,	  it	  was	  unavailable	  until	  early	  October	  (and	  even	  then	  only	  in	  limited	  
quantities).3	  The	  slow	  production	  time	  coupled	  with	  the	  high	  expectations	  of	  American	  
communities	  made	  the	  vaccination	  process	  a	  national	  challenge.	  This	  paper	  seeks	  to	  
understand	  the	  actions	  taken	  by	  individual	  states	  to	  meet	  this	  challenge.	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  2009	  H1N1	  Pandemic,	  several	  states	  published	  After	  Action	  Reports	  to	  
examine	  their	  strategies	  and	  strengths	  during	  this	  public	  health	  crisis.	  These	  reports	  provide	  a	  
unique	  insight	  into	  the	  individual	  states’	  impressions	  of	  how	  their	  particular	  healthcare	  system	  
performed	  during	  outbreaks	  of	  H1N1.	  In	  order	  to	  improve	  the	  healthcare	  response	  for	  future	  
pandemics,	  a	  review	  of	  these	  reports	  is	  necessary	  to	  learn	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  from	  those	  who	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were	  heavily	  involved	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  pandemic.	  This	  paper	  provides	  an	  overview	  
and	  analysis	  of	  the	  After	  Action	  Reports	  of	  fourteen	  diverse	  states;	  the	  states	  range	  in	  size	  from	  
Rhode	  Island	  to	  California,	  and	  in	  location	  from	  Massachusetts	  to	  Nevada.	  The	  reports	  reveal	  
key	  themes	  and	  trends	  within	  the	  vaccine	  management	  strategies	  of	  each	  state;	  using	  these,	  
we	  provide	  a	  clear	  explanation	  of	  why	  state	  health	  departments	  were	  ill-­‐prepared	  for	  the	  
events	  of	  the	  H1N1	  Pandemic	  despite	  each	  having	  created	  a	  Preparedness	  Plan	  specifically	  for	  a	  
pandemic	  scenario.	  In	  particular,	  miscommunication	  between	  all	  levels	  of	  health	  departments	  
and	  gaps	  in	  the	  preparedness	  measures	  contributed	  to	  uncoordinated	  and	  frustrating	  state	  
vaccination	  campaigns.	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   In	  2005,	  the	  government	  mandated	  that	  each	  state	  create	  a	  preparedness	  plan	  to	  be	  
used	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  pandemic.	  These	  plans	  were	  meant	  to	  aid	  the	  vaccine	  distribution	  within	  
states	  by	  defining	  a	  logical	  structure	  of	  management	  and	  allocation	  for	  the	  next	  pandemic	  
scenario.	  However,	  most	  of	  the	  preparedness	  plans	  were	  not	  realized	  during	  the	  actual	  H1N1	  
Pandemic	  and	  as	  a	  result	  many	  states	  did	  not	  have	  a	  premade	  plan	  for	  vaccine	  distribution.	  
	   The	  primary	  reason	  for	  this	  neglect	  was	  that	  the	  plans	  were	  not	  compatible	  with	  the	  
specifics	  of	  the	  H1N1	  2009	  Pandemic.	  Each	  plan	  had	  been	  created	  in	  anticipation	  of	  an	  H5N1	  
Pandemic,	  an	  event	  which	  would	  likely	  have	  generated	  more	  cases	  and	  deaths.	  Each	  report	  was	  
structured	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  pandemic	  that	  began	  in	  Asia,	  assuming	  a	  lag	  time	  of	  weeks	  between	  
the	  initial	  cases	  in	  the	  world	  and	  the	  initial	  ones	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  This	  lag	  time	  would	  have	  
been	  used	  to	  pull	  the	  healthcare	  system	  together,	  begin	  vaccine	  production,	  and	  in	  general	  get	  
America	  ready	  for	  the	  pandemic	  to	  strike	  locally.	  When	  the	  H1N1	  Pandemic	  appeared	  in	  
Mexico,	  the	  time	  between	  reports	  of	  cases	  internationally	  and	  nationally	  was	  much	  less	  than	  
expected.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  preparedness	  plans	  each	  state	  had	  constructed	  were	  not	  easily	  scaled	  
to	  the	  situation	  encountered	  with	  H1N1;	  states	  abandoned	  their	  plans	  in	  favor	  of	  meeting	  the	  
more	  recent	  CDC	  recommendations	  and	  dealing	  with	  the	  cases	  within	  their	  jurisdictions	  as	  best	  
they	  could.	  	  
	   It	  was	  those	  states	  which	  had	  practice	  holding	  mass	  vaccination	  clinics	  and	  which	  were	  
aware	  of	  their	  risk	  group	  population	  composition	  that	  handled	  the	  H1N1	  vaccine	  distribution	  
and	  allocation	  the	  best.	  These	  advantages	  were	  primarily	  due	  to	  annual	  vaccine	  campaigns	  held	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by	  the	  states	  for	  the	  seasonal	  flu	  vaccine.	  Thus	  in	  addition	  to	  analyzing	  vaccine	  distribution	  
methods	  within	  states,	  this	  paper	  will	  show	  that	  the	  relative	  success	  of	  states	  with	  seasonal	  flu	  
vaccine	  campaigns	  reveals	  the	  necessity	  of	  practicing	  a	  preparedness	  plan	  before	  it	  must	  be	  
applied.	  
	  
The	  2009	  H1N1	  Vaccination	  Campaign	  
	  
	   By	  January	  2,	  2010,	  only	  20.3%	  of	  the	  United	  States	  population	  had	  been	  vaccinated	  
against	  H1N1.1	  The	  pandemic	  that	  had	  generated	  enough	  fear	  to	  warrant	  large-­‐scale	  
production	  of	  a	  vaccine	  in	  the	  first	  place	  was	  barely	  mitigated	  by	  vaccination	  efforts	  at	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  second	  wave.	  The	  most	  immediate	  reason	  for	  this	  low	  rate	  was	  the	  slow	  production	  of	  
vaccines;	  vaccine	  providers,	  or	  those	  registered	  to	  administer	  the	  vaccine	  to	  the	  public,	  were	  
frustrated	  when	  they	  did	  not	  receive	  enough	  from	  vaccine	  manufacturers	  to	  inoculate	  
individuals	  seeking	  medical	  protection	  against	  H1N1	  in	  the	  fall.2	  Vaccine	  production	  was	  clearly	  
behind	  schedule,	  and	  the	  news	  media	  kept	  Americans	  well-­‐aware	  of	  this	  fact.3	  By	  the	  time	  the	  
vaccine	  was	  being	  produced	  in	  sufficient	  quantities,	  the	  fall	  flu	  season	  had	  passed1	  and	  there	  
was	  no	  longer	  an	  immediate	  incentive	  for	  the	  public	  to	  want	  to	  be	  vaccinated.	  
	   The	  slow	  production	  rate	  was	  a	  significant	  factor	  in	  the	  decision	  of	  79.7%	  of	  Americans	  
to	  not	  get	  vaccinated.	  However,	  a	  recent	  paper	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  vaccine	  during	  fall	  
2009	  found	  that	  it	  was	  distributed	  uniformly	  to	  individual	  states	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  was	  produced	  
regardless	  of	  a	  state’s	  pandemic	  status.	  In	  fact,	  for	  several	  southern	  states,	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  
population	  had	  already	  been	  infected	  by	  the	  time	  the	  vaccine	  was	  made	  available.4	  The	  
incentive	  for	  individuals	  in	  these	  states	  to	  be	  vaccinated	  was	  understandably	  lower,	  and	  since	  
the	  peak	  in	  the	  state	  epidemic	  curve	  had	  already	  passed	  more	  inoculations	  were	  not	  likely	  to	  
make	  a	  large	  difference	  in	  the	  overall	  number	  of	  H1N1	  cases.	  	  
	   The	  findings	  of	  this	  recent	  paper	  suggest	  that	  the	  distribution	  of	  vaccines	  plays	  a	  large	  
role	  in	  a	  vaccine’s	  effectiveness.	  The	  paper	  looked	  at	  the	  distribution	  through	  a	  time	  lens:	  when	  
is	  it	  best	  for	  a	  state	  to	  receive	  vaccine?	  Clearly,	  vaccinating	  before	  the	  peak	  in	  the	  epidemic	  
curve	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  larger	  impact	  on	  the	  number	  of	  people	  who	  are	  infected.	  We	  take	  this	  
research	  one	  step	  further	  by	  examining	  the	  distribution	  of	  vaccine	  through	  a	  different	  lens:	  
logistics.	  This	  focus	  allows	  for	  both	  a	  review	  of	  the	  vaccine	  distribution	  methods	  within	  a	  state	  
and	  for	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  delay	  in	  vaccine	  distribution	  versus	  administration	  observed	  in	  the	  
2009	  H1N1	  Pandemic.4	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Vaccine	  Distribution:	  Conceptual	  Model	  
	  	  
	   The	  purpose	  behind	  any	  vaccination	  campaign	  is	  to	  inoculate	  as	  many	  people	  as	  
possible	  to	  prevent	  the	  spread	  of	  an	  infectious	  disease.	  Though	  the	  term	  “campaign”	  suggests	  a	  
large-­‐scale	  operation,	  the	  distribution	  of	  vaccine	  is	  best	  understood	  through	  a	  conceptual	  
framework	  which	  builds	  up	  from	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  supply	  chain:	  an	  individual	  receiving	  a	  single	  
shot.	  
	   The	  vaccine	  is,	  to	  this	  individual,	  most	  likely	  a	  clear,	  unknown	  liquid	  substance	  that	  he	  or	  
she	  believes	  will	  help	  ward	  off	  illness.	  A	  single	  dose	  of	  the	  vaccine	  is	  administered	  to	  this	  
individual	  by	  a	  nurse	  or	  other	  trained	  healthcare	  personnel.	  This	  nurse	  (for	  example)	  received	  a	  
set	  number	  of	  doses	  from	  the	  clinic	  or	  school	  where	  the	  vaccine	  is	  being	  given	  out	  before	  the	  
individual	  came	  in	  for	  a	  shot.	  These	  doses,	  in	  turn,	  were	  sent	  to	  the	  clinic	  from	  an	  upper	  level	  of	  
distribution:	  the	  local	  health	  department,	  for	  instance,	  or	  even	  the	  state	  health	  department.	  In	  
order	  for	  this	  individual	  to	  be	  inoculated	  with	  the	  vaccine,	  therefore,	  the	  nurse	  needs	  to	  have	  a	  
dose	  on	  hand	  when	  the	  individual	  walks	  into	  the	  clinic.	  This	  implies	  that	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  
sufficient	  number	  of	  doses	  with	  the	  nurse	  to	  administer	  to	  anyone	  who	  walks	  into	  the	  clinic	  
looking	  for	  a	  vaccine.	  	  
	   Following	  this	  conceptual	  model	  farther	  up	  the	  chain	  of	  vaccine	  administration,	  it	  is	  
clear	  that	  the	  individual	  looking	  for	  a	  vaccine	  will	  only	  get	  one	  if	  there	  is	  enough	  being	  
produced	  by	  the	  vaccine	  manufacturers,	  and	  if	  the	  amount	  that	  is	  produced	  can	  be	  wisely	  
distributed	  among	  the	  states	  and	  the	  counties	  within	  each	  state.	  A	  lack	  of	  coordination	  at	  any	  
level	  connecting	  the	  individual	  to	  the	  manufacturers	  of	  the	  vaccine	  jeopardizes	  the	  overall	  goal	  
of	  the	  vaccine	  campaign:	  to	  inoculate	  as	  many	  people	  as	  possible	  and	  prevent	  the	  spread	  of	  
disease.	  	  
	   The	  After	  Action	  Reports	  touch	  on	  this	  chain	  of	  distribution	  for	  the	  2009	  H1N1	  Pandemic	  
and	  show	  that	  the	  ability	  of	  states	  to	  hold	  successful	  vaccine	  campaigns	  was	  severely	  impacted	  
by	  communication	  throughout	  the	  chain	  linking	  vaccine	  providers	  to	  the	  decisions	  made	  on	  the	  
federal	  level.	  In	  turn,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  states	  adapted	  to	  federal	  decisions	  impacted	  local	  
health	  departments	  and	  the	  inoculation	  of	  individuals	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis.	  	  	  	  	  	  
These	  After	  Action	  Reports	  generally	  collected	  data	  from	  a	  focus	  group	  of	  healthcare	  
professionals	  at	  one	  of	  several	  conferences	  held	  by	  states	  after	  the	  2009	  H1N1	  Pandemic.	  The	  
reports	  often	  included	  a	  breakdown	  of	  who	  contributed:	  hospital	  professionals,	  managers,	  
school	  nurses,	  healthcare	  workers	  and	  several	  other	  portions	  of	  the	  healthcare	  industry	  were	  
typically	  present	  at	  a	  given	  conference.	  Though	  the	  numbers	  of	  each	  were	  usually	  small	  (on	  the	  
order	  of	  ones	  to	  tens),	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  reviewing	  a	  state’s	  response	  to	  a	  well-­‐known	  
pandemic	  their	  feedback	  was	  often	  sufficient	  to	  get	  a	  general	  idea	  of	  what	  had	  occurred	  within	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   The	  state	  health	  departments	  who	  submitted	  AARs	  revealed	  several	  similar	  issues	  with	  
the	  dissemination	  of	  information	  from	  the	  national	  level	  which	  impacted	  their	  ability	  to	  
distribute	  vaccines.	  The	  most	  evident	  of	  these	  issues	  was	  miscommunication	  about	  when	  and	  
how	  many	  vaccines	  were	  going	  to	  be	  available	  after	  the	  first	  production	  round.	  Massachusetts,	  
for	  instance,	  reports	  that	  the	  communication	  of	  the	  date	  of	  vaccine	  release	  was	  misleading;	  “As	  
required	  by	  MDPH,	  many	  [local	  health	  departments	  or	  providers]	  had	  scheduled	  and	  advertised	  
H1N1	  clinics	  during	  late	  October	  and	  early	  November	  that	  had	  to	  be	  cancelled.”	  The	  
anticipation	  of	  the	  vaccine	  exceeded	  the	  reality;	  this	  naturally	  caused	  frustration	  among	  the	  
public	  and	  health	  officials	  when	  promises	  of	  clinics	  were	  not	  able	  to	  be	  met	  due	  to	  late	  vaccine	  
production.	  Virginia	  ran	  into	  the	  same	  problem;	  their	  AAR	  states	  that	  “The	  roll-­‐out	  of	  the	  public	  
communication	  campaign	  for	  vaccination	  before	  vaccine	  was	  available	  was	  problematic.”	  The	  
communication	  between	  the	  CDC	  and	  the	  states	  was	  therefore	  too	  optimistic	  at	  times,	  causing	  
providers	  within	  states	  to	  make	  promises	  to	  their	  populations	  that	  they	  could	  not	  keep.	  	  
	   Not	  all	  states	  reported	  having	  this	  problem,	  however;	  in	  fact,	  the	  AARs	  suggest	  that	  it	  
was	  primarily	  larger	  states	  that	  ran	  into	  the	  issue	  of	  advertising	  the	  vaccine	  too	  early	  based	  on	  
reports	  from	  the	  national	  level.	  Smaller	  states	  generally	  did	  not	  have	  to	  rely	  heavily	  on	  
announcements	  and	  could	  more	  easily	  mobilize	  a	  vaccine	  campaign	  given	  their	  population	  
sizes.	  They	  may	  not	  have	  needed	  to	  plan	  as	  far	  ahead	  as	  the	  more	  populous	  states.	  
	   Regardless,	  there	  was	  one	  significant	  communication	  issue	  which	  impacted	  all	  of	  the	  
states	  that	  submitted	  AARs.	  The	  CDC	  published	  a	  list	  of	  risk	  groups	  that	  the	  states	  were	  
supposed	  to	  attempt	  to	  vaccinate	  first.	  These	  groups	  included	  pregnant	  women,	  healthcare	  
workers,	  and	  children	  between	  two	  age	  groups	  (very	  young	  to	  young	  adult).	  Providers	  within	  
several	  states	  noted	  that	  the	  risk	  groups	  seemed	  to	  keep	  changing,	  and	  they	  were	  unclear	  as	  to	  
which	  groups	  they	  should	  be	  prioritizing.	  Additionally,	  health	  departments	  were	  often	  fielding	  
calls	  from	  senior	  citizens	  demanding	  to	  know	  why	  they	  had	  not	  been	  included	  in	  the	  risk	  
groups.	  A	  lack	  of	  both	  a	  clear	  explanation	  of	  the	  logic	  behind	  these	  risk	  group	  choices	  and	  a	  
consistent	  message	  	  of	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  risk	  groups	  made	  it	  difficult	  for	  states	  to	  follow	  
the	  recommendations	  of	  the	  CDC	  when	  it	  came	  to	  vaccinating	  only	  certain	  portions	  of	  their	  
population.	  In	  Wisconsin,	  for	  instance,	  some	  local	  health	  departments	  administered	  the	  vaccine	  
based	  on	  risk	  groups,	  and	  others	  did	  not	  (either	  they	  did	  not	  see	  the	  point	  or	  were	  confused	  
about	  who	  fit	  into	  what	  risk	  groups)	  and	  “Many	  health	  departments	  indicated	  frustration	  when	  
other	  health	  departments	  did	  not	  follow	  the	  target	  groups	  and	  felt	  DPH	  should	  have	  enforced	  
adherence	  to	  target	  groups,	  while	  a	  few	  health	  departments	  felt	  they	  should	  have	  been	  able	  to	  
make	  their	  own	  decision	  regarding	  when	  to	  expand	  the	  target	  groups.”	  The	  local	  health	  
departments	  of	  California	  ran	  into	  similar	  issues:	  what	  the	  risk	  groups	  were	  and	  why	  they	  were	  
chosen	  was	  unclear,	  making	  the	  formulation	  of	  a	  vaccine	  campaign	  based	  on	  these	  groups	  
difficult.	  
	   The	  confusion	  concerning	  the	  composition	  of	  risk	  groups	  was	  further	  compounded	  once	  
the	  first	  batch	  of	  vaccines	  arrived	  in	  the	  states.	  The	  initial	  shipment	  was	  both	  much	  smaller	  
than	  health	  departments	  had	  anticipated	  and	  consisted	  entirely	  of	  the	  nasal-­‐spray	  version	  of	  
the	  vaccine.	  This	  was	  the	  fastest	  type	  to	  produce,	  but	  it	  also	  contained	  LAIV	  (live	  attenuated	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influenza	  virus)	  which	  posed	  a	  potential	  health	  hazard	  to	  certain	  demographics.	  In	  essence,	  the	  
type	  of	  vaccine	  first	  shipped	  was	  incompatible	  with	  pregnant	  women	  and	  younger	  age	  groups—
in	  fact,	  it	  was	  only	  recommended	  for	  healthy	  people	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  2	  and	  49.	  Thus	  first	  
batch	  of	  vaccine	  could	  not	  be	  used	  on	  most	  of	  the	  risk	  groups,	  prompting	  further	  confusion	  
when	  states	  attempted	  to	  follow	  CDC	  instructions	  and	  vaccinate	  at-­‐risk	  individuals	  before	  
anyone	  else.	  	  
Additionally,	  since	  the	  initial	  shipment	  was	  smaller	  than	  anticipated	  the	  risk	  group	  
criteria	  were	  refined	  by	  the	  CDC.	  The	  initial	  groups	  included	  pregnant	  women,	  healthcare	  
workers,	  caregivers	  to	  infants,	  people	  between	  6	  months	  and	  24	  years	  of	  age,	  and	  people	  ages	  
25	  to	  64	  with	  other	  medical	  issues.	  The	  revised	  groups	  still	  included	  pregnant	  women	  (who	  
could	  not	  use	  the	  first	  batch	  of	  vaccine),	  healthcare	  workers	  and	  caregivers,	  and	  now	  children	  
between	  the	  ages	  of	  6	  months	  and	  4	  years	  (those	  under	  2	  could	  not	  receive	  the	  first	  vaccine	  
shipped)	  and	  children	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  5-­‐18	  years	  with	  chronic	  health	  conditions	  (also	  
incompatible	  with	  the	  first	  vaccine	  shipped).1	  	  
	   Therefore,	  vaccine	  distribution	  within	  the	  states	  was	  confounded	  by	  communication	  at	  
the	  national	  level.	  The	  production	  time	  of	  the	  vaccine	  was	  not	  something	  any	  level	  of	  
healthcare	  could	  have	  improved.	  The	  messages	  concerning	  when	  the	  vaccine	  would	  first	  be	  
shipped,	  however,	  could	  have	  been	  more	  accurate.	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  the	  need	  to	  vaccinate	  the	  
most	  at-­‐risk	  people	  first	  was	  well-­‐communicated,	  though	  exactly	  how	  this	  should	  be	  done	  was	  
not	  as	  obvious.	  It	  would	  be	  best	  in	  the	  future	  to	  be	  consistent	  about	  who	  should	  be	  getting	  
vaccinated	  first	  and	  to	  give	  directions	  for	  what	  states	  should	  do	  if	  the	  first	  batch	  of	  vaccines	  
cannot	  be	  used	  on	  some	  of	  the	  most	  at-­‐risk	  populations.	  Many	  states	  were	  paralyzed	  by	  their	  
desire	  to	  follow	  the	  protocols	  and	  recommendations	  of	  the	  CDC;	  either	  more	  of	  both	  need	  to	  
be	  created	  in	  anticipation	  of	  contingencies,	  or	  the	  states	  need	  to	  be	  explicitly	  given	  more	  
autonomy	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  vaccinating	  their	  own	  populations.	  Overall,	  a	  review	  of	  the	  national	  
to	  state	  communication	  reveals	  that	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  resulted	  were	  unavoidable	  at	  the	  
time,	  but	  with	  careful	  planning	  they	  could	  become	  avoidable.	  Delays	  in	  vaccines	  should	  be	  
expected	  and	  risk	  groups	  should	  be	  kept	  consistent	  throughout,	  especially	  if	  the	  overall	  goal	  is	  
to	  prevent	  as	  many	  infections	  as	  possible.	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   Despite	  the	  mixed	  messages	  in	  the	  national	  to	  state	  level	  communication,	  some	  AARs	  
reported	  comparatively	  successful	  vaccine	  campaigns.	  Other	  states	  cited	  continued	  frustration	  
and	  planning	  issues.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  factors	  in	  a	  well-­‐executed	  state	  vaccine	  campaign,	  
independent	  of	  communication	  with	  agencies	  such	  as	  the	  CDC,	  was	  the	  vaccine	  distribution	  
method.	  
	   There	  were	  three	  main	  strategies	  reportedly	  used	  to	  distribute	  vaccine	  within	  states.	  
The	  first	  and	  most	  common	  method	  was	  determining	  distribution	  based	  on	  an	  online	  ordering	  
system	  analogous	  to	  an	  internet	  store.	  Those	  registered	  to	  administer	  the	  vaccine	  were	  given	  a	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link	  to	  a	  website	  created	  and	  maintained	  by	  their	  state	  health	  departments;	  at	  these	  sites,	  they	  
could	  electronically	  request	  a	  specific	  amount	  of	  vaccine	  from	  the	  state.	  Then	  the	  state	  health	  
departments	  would	  receive	  vaccine	  directly	  from	  the	  manufacturers,	  and	  providers	  such	  as	  
doctors’	  offices	  and	  local	  health	  departments	  would	  subsequently	  receive	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  
vaccine	  based	  on	  their	  orders.	  The	  vaccine	  would	  then	  be	  given	  out	  to	  the	  general	  public	  by	  the	  
providers.	  	  
The	  second	  method	  was	  population	  based;	  with	  this	  plan,	  the	  state	  health	  departments	  
would	  again	  receive	  vaccine	  directly	  from	  the	  manufacturers,	  but	  they	  would	  distribute	  the	  
vaccine	  to	  their	  counties	  proportional	  to	  the	  population	  of	  each	  county.	  From	  there,	  the	  local	  
health	  departments	  and	  providers	  in	  each	  county	  were	  responsible	  for	  getting	  the	  vaccine	  to	  
the	  public.	  The	  third	  method	  was	  a	  modification	  of	  the	  second;	  population	  based,	  except	  this	  
time	  the	  populations	  of	  concern	  were	  the	  risk	  groups.	  There	  were	  a	  scattering	  of	  other	  
distribution	  methods	  as	  well,	  but	  those	  were	  used	  by	  one	  state	  at	  most.	  	  
	   The	  AARs	  indicate	  that	  the	  most	  popular	  method	  was	  also	  the	  least	  successful	  in	  terms	  
of	  equitably	  and	  quickly	  getting	  the	  vaccine	  to	  the	  public.	  Additionally,	  states	  which	  had	  
experience	  with	  seasonal	  flu	  vaccine	  campaigns	  generally	  fared	  better	  than	  those	  without	  
regardless	  of	  the	  distribution	  method	  used	  during	  fall	  2009.	  	  
	   For	  instance,	  Massachusetts	  used	  the	  online-­‐ordering	  method	  to	  distribute	  vaccine	  
within	  its	  state.	  From	  the	  accounts	  in	  its	  AAR,	  this	  method	  generated	  more	  confusion	  than	  
vaccine	  in	  the	  first	  weeks	  of	  shipments.	  The	  report	  cites	  “the	  confusion	  experienced	  and	  lack	  of	  
guidance	  on	  how	  to	  make	  the	  original	  vaccine	  request	  to	  MDPH”	  specifically	  when	  dealing	  with	  
determining	  how	  much	  vaccine	  to	  order,	  for	  which	  “No	  direction	  of	  how	  to	  arrive	  at	  that	  
number	  was	  given.”	  As	  a	  result,	  regions	  either	  divided	  or	  meshed	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  maximize	  the	  
amount	  of	  vaccine	  they	  were	  likely	  to	  get	  based	  on	  the	  populations	  they	  served.	  Some	  ordered	  
for	  their	  entire	  populations,	  others	  only	  for	  population	  subsets,	  creating	  “confusion	  and	  
disharmony	  between	  local	  health	  departments.”	  Finally,	  the	  AAR	  specifically	  states	  that	  
“[providers]	  decided	  to	  store	  the	  small	  quantities	  of	  vaccine	  they	  received	  until	  enough	  was	  
sent	  to	  the	  health	  department	  to	  hold	  clinics	  in	  schools,”	  delaying	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  
vaccine	  until	  days	  after	  the	  first	  shipment.	  The	  AAR	  reports	  that	  the	  first	  vaccine	  was	  present	  in	  
Massachusetts	  on	  October	  5,	  2009,	  but	  ten	  days	  later	  many	  towns	  were	  still	  complaining	  about	  
not	  having	  received	  the	  vaccine.	  	  
	   Massachusetts	  was	  not	  alone	  when	  it	  came	  to	  confusion	  generated	  by	  an	  online	  
ordering	  system	  for	  vaccine.	  Wisconsin	  providers	  also	  experienced	  frustration	  with	  their	  online	  
system.	  Comments	  in	  the	  AAR	  from	  healthcare	  workers	  labeled	  the	  process	  as	  “inequitable”	  
and	  “cumbersome.”	  This	  was	  due	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  ordering	  system;	  for	  instance,	  “[m]any	  
agencies	  thought	  when	  they	  pre-­‐registered	  or	  registered	  that	  they	  had	  also	  placed	  an	  order	  for	  
vaccine,	  which	  was	  not	  the	  case.”	  Additionally,	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  vaccine,	  the	  policy	  was	  to	  
place	  an	  order	  after	  scheduling	  a	  vaccine	  clinic.	  In	  fact,	  providers	  had	  to	  report	  the	  date	  of	  a	  
clinic	  on	  their	  order	  form.	  However,	  many	  providers	  who	  scheduled	  clinics	  before	  ordering	  had	  
to	  cancel	  them	  when	  less	  vaccine	  than	  requested	  (or	  no	  vaccine	  at	  all)	  arrived	  by	  the	  planned	  
administration	  dates.	  Several	  refused	  to	  follow	  this	  protocol.	  One	  provider	  even	  stated	  “I	  do	  
not	  believe	  in	  scheduling	  clinics	  until	  we	  have	  vaccine	  in	  our	  refrigerator,”	  a	  belief	  which	  further	  
complicated	  the	  task	  of	  ordering	  vaccine	  and,	  ultimately,	  getting	  enough	  people	  vaccinated.	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   California’s	  online	  system	  was	  similarly	  difficult	  to	  navigate.	  Like	  Wisconsin,	  “many	  
providers…believed	  their	  ‘requests’	  were	  actually	  vaccine	  ‘orders,’”	  a	  clear	  problem	  with	  
regards	  to	  both	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  providers	  and	  the	  logistics	  of	  distributing	  the	  vaccine	  
within	  the	  state.	  The	  distribution	  of	  vaccine	  was	  also,	  in	  the	  end,	  deemed	  inequitable	  by	  the	  
contributors	  to	  the	  AAR.	  Likewise,	  Delaware	  providers	  “were	  confused	  about	  pre-­‐registration	  
and	  enrollment	  to	  receive	  vaccine”	  as	  they	  also	  had	  to	  navigate	  a	  multi-­‐step,	  unclear	  ordering	  
system	  to	  acquire	  vaccines.	  In	  the	  same	  spirit,	  North	  Dakota	  reported	  it	  needed	  “improvements	  
to	  the	  vaccine	  registration	  software	  to	  increase	  end-­‐user	  capabilities.”	  	  
	   In	  general,	  the	  system	  of	  ordering	  vaccines	  online	  made	  sense	  from	  a	  theoretical	  
perspective.	  Providers	  could	  request	  only	  what	  they	  anticipated	  using	  based	  on	  their	  target	  
populations.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  vaccine	  would	  get	  where	  it	  needed	  to	  be	  with	  little	  excess.	  
However,	  in	  practice	  this	  method	  would	  have	  worked	  better	  if	  the	  ordering	  system	  had	  been	  
tested	  before	  the	  2009	  H1N1	  Pandemic	  necessitated	  its	  use.	  Providers	  needed	  clearer	  
directions	  and	  stricter	  guidelines	  when	  it	  came	  to	  using	  this	  system.	  Additionally,	  most	  states	  
were	  working	  with	  over	  500	  providers	  which	  made	  coordinating	  between	  the	  sheer	  number	  of	  
orders	  and	  the	  much	  smaller	  number	  of	  vaccines	  difficult.	  Oftentimes,	  states	  using	  the	  online	  
ordering	  method	  would	  lose	  track	  of	  vaccine	  shipments.	  Providers	  had	  no	  way	  of	  judging	  when	  
they	  would	  receive	  the	  vaccine	  from	  the	  state,	  or	  even	  if	  they	  would	  receive	  vaccine.	  The	  online	  
interfaces	  used	  by	  states	  were	  not	  designed	  to	  solicit	  or	  incorporate	  feedback;	  thus	  confusion	  
was	  compounded	  with	  uncertainty.	  
	   It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  online	  ordering	  system	  could	  become	  feasible	  with	  practice,	  
stricter	  guidelines,	  and	  enough	  vaccines	  to	  distribute	  during	  a	  given	  pandemic.	  However,	  given	  
a	  scenario	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  which	  states	  encountered	  during	  the	  first	  weeks	  of	  October,	  when	  
the	  interest	  in	  getting	  vaccinated	  was	  highest	  and	  the	  actual	  number	  of	  vaccines	  lowest,	  other	  
distribution	  methods	  should	  be	  preferred.	  This	  will	  avoid	  confusion	  and	  uncertainty	  on	  the	  
provider’s	  part,	  hesitation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  state	  health	  departments,	  and	  disinterest	  in	  the	  
vaccine	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  target	  populations.	  
	   Other	  methods	  to	  consider	  for	  future	  vaccine	  distribution	  during	  times	  of	  high	  demand	  
and	  low	  supply	  include	  population	  distribution:	  allocating	  vaccine	  to	  counties	  or	  local	  health	  
departments	  based	  on	  the	  populations	  each	  serve.	  Vermont	  and	  Montana	  both	  reported	  using	  
population	  as	  the	  measure	  for	  how	  much	  vaccine	  would	  be	  given	  to	  local	  health	  departments.	  
Montana	  handled	  the	  vaccine	  shortage	  remarkably	  well	  according	  to	  their	  records,	  “allocating	  
supplies	  according	  to	  packaging	  and	  population	  [since	  this]	  has	  been	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Montana	  
Public	  Health	  Emergency	  Preparedness	  Strategic	  National	  Stockpile	  planning	  for	  several	  years.”	  
The	  state	  health	  department	  made	  sure	  that	  every	  jurisdiction	  in	  Montana	  received	  a	  small	  
baseline	  amount	  of	  vaccine.	  From	  there,	  the	  AAR	  indicates	  that	  the	  Montana	  state	  health	  
department	  may	  even	  have	  used	  epidemiological	  surveillance	  from	  jurisdictions	  to	  portion	  out	  
the	  remaining	  vaccine.	  This	  tactic	  required	  time	  and	  manpower	  to	  repackage	  the	  vaccines	  into	  
smaller	  shipments,	  but	  on	  the	  whole	  it	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  successful	  in	  minimizing	  confusion	  
and	  getting	  at	  least	  some	  vaccine	  to	  every	  population	  group	  in	  the	  state.	  	  
Vermont	  also	  reports	  distributing	  on	  a	  population	  basis;	  however,	  there	  were	  more	  
complaints	  about	  the	  distribution	  in	  the	  AAR	  than	  with	  Montana.	  Healthcare	  professionals	  
considered	  it	  erratic;	  the	  vaccine	  still	  had	  to	  be	  ordered	  to	  some	  capacity	  and	  this	  step	  in	  the	  
system	  often	  caused	  delays	  and	  general	  confusion.	  The	  difference	  between	  Montana’s	  success	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and	  Vermont’s	  frustration	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  level	  of	  coordination	  present	  when	  using	  the	  
population	  distribution	  method.	  Montana	  made	  sure	  to	  get	  a	  base	  amount	  to	  providers	  and	  
invested	  resources	  in	  making	  the	  vaccine	  shipments	  received	  from	  the	  manufacturers	  more	  
convenient	  for	  the	  state	  to	  distribute.	  Vermont,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  also	  used	  a	  population	  
distribution	  method	  but	  ran	  into	  trouble	  with	  the	  associated	  vaccine	  request	  system.	  	  
	   A	  slightly	  more	  refined	  distribution	  method,	  risk	  population,	  was	  used	  by	  several	  states	  
to	  varying	  degrees	  of	  success.	  New	  Mexico,	  for	  instance,	  only	  used	  this	  method	  initially	  but	  with	  
promising	  results.	  The	  state	  health	  department	  had	  a	  structure	  for	  vaccine	  clinics	  already	  in	  
place	  from	  annual	  seasonal	  flu	  clinics,	  which	  helped	  organize	  the	  administration	  of	  vaccine	  once	  
they	  were	  acquired	  and	  also	  helped	  to	  inform	  which	  organizations	  (schools,	  offices,	  hospitals,	  
clinics)	  could	  administer	  the	  vaccine	  to	  the	  public	  most	  efficiently.	  The	  state	  health	  department	  
sent	  population-­‐portioned	  amounts	  of	  vaccine	  to	  five	  regional	  public	  health	  offices	  which,	  in	  
turn,	  allocated	  those	  vaccine	  shipments	  to	  the	  fifty	  local	  health	  offices.	  The	  state	  health	  
department	  also	  independently	  narrowed	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  risks	  groups	  once	  the	  vaccine	  
shortage	  was	  realized	  and,	  like	  Montana,	  organized	  the	  repackaging	  of	  vaccine	  into	  smaller	  
shipments.	  These	  measures	  appear	  to	  have	  worked	  well	  in	  terms	  of	  minimizing	  confusion	  and	  
maximizing	  efficiency	  when	  it	  came	  to	  getting	  the	  public	  access	  to	  the	  H1N1	  vaccine.	  The	  AAR	  
cites	  the	  “38%	  of	  those	  individuals	  residing	  in	  the	  State	  of	  New	  Mexico	  who	  fall	  within	  the	  five	  
initial	  target	  groups”	  vaccinated	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  national	  average	  of	  24%	  as	  evidence	  of	  
their	  success.	  
	  Alaska,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  had	  a	  more	  direct	  distribution	  pathway	  from	  state	  to	  
citizens,	  but	  also	  initially	  allocated	  vaccine	  based	  on	  the	  population	  of	  risk	  groups.	  The	  state	  
health	  department	  had	  a	  much	  larger	  hand	  in	  the	  vaccine	  distribution	  in	  Alaska	  than	  in	  New	  
Mexico.	  State	  healthcare	  workers	  personally	  delivered	  vaccine	  to	  registered	  providers	  and	  
made	  a	  significant	  effort	  to	  contact	  the	  local	  populations	  living	  in	  the	  wildernesses	  of	  Alaska	  
and	  get	  vaccine	  to	  them.	  In	  general,	  distribution	  by	  risk	  group	  population	  worked	  well	  given	  the	  
vaccine	  shortage	  the	  nation	  encountered	  during	  the	  fall	  wave	  of	  H1N1	  because	  it	  focused	  on	  
maximizing	  the	  amount	  of	  vaccine	  being	  received	  by	  the	  people	  who	  needed	  it	  the	  most.	  This	  
strategy	  would	  likely	  work	  poorly	  in	  times	  of	  vaccine	  abundance	  due	  to	  comparatively	  lower	  
vaccine	  demand,	  but	  for	  the	  initial	  stages	  of	  vaccine	  distribution	  it	  made	  sense.	  
	   	  	  	  There	  were	  other	  methods	  to	  allocate	  vaccine	  attempted	  by	  states,	  such	  as	  an	  
algorithm	  used	  by	  Nevada	  based	  on	  population,	  patient	  load,	  target	  population,	  and	  other	  
logistic	  parameters.	  This	  algorithm	  was	  labor	  intensive	  to	  maintain	  and	  update	  as	  the	  flu	  season	  
progressed.	  Additionally,	  the	  algorithm	  did	  not	  function	  well	  when	  it	  attempted	  to	  incorporate	  
the	  vaccine	  shortage	  into	  its	  calculations;	  instead,	  the	  health	  department	  of	  Nevada	  allocated	  
the	  vaccine	  to	  providers	  who	  could	  use	  it	  the	  fastest.	  New	  Jersey	  distributed	  the	  vaccine	  
through	  several	  routes,	  including	  directly	  to	  businesses.	  Goldman	  Sachs,	  for	  instance,	  got	  its	  
employees	  inoculated	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  after	  the	  manufacturers	  completed	  the	  vaccine.	  
Though	  the	  feat	  of	  inoculating	  any	  significant	  population	  group	  was	  impressive,	  the	  fact	  that	  
this	  group	  worked	  for	  a	  wealthy	  company	  caused	  a	  public	  relations	  mess	  for	  the	  New	  Jersey	  
state	  health	  department.	  
	   In	  the	  end,	  the	  distribution	  methods	  of	  each	  state	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  perceived	  
success	  of	  their	  individual	  vaccine	  campaigns.	  The	  AARs	  of	  several	  of	  the	  states	  reveal	  that	  the	  
best	  methods	  for	  vaccine	  distribution	  in	  times	  of	  shortage	  are	  based	  on	  population;	  ideally,	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they	  are	  based	  on	  risk	  group	  populations.	  The	  online	  ordering	  method	  can	  work	  well	  with	  an	  
abundance	  of	  vaccine,	  but	  only	  if	  the	  system	  has	  been	  thoroughly	  explained	  to	  the	  providers	  
and,	  ideally,	  tested	  beforehand.	  The	  online	  ordering	  method	  appears	  best	  able	  to	  handle	  the	  
allocation	  of	  large	  amounts	  of	  vaccine,	  while	  the	  population-­‐based	  methods	  seem	  adept	  at	  
making	  sure	  some	  vaccine	  is	  put	  to	  good	  use	  during	  times	  of	  scarcity.	  
	   Additionally,	  states	  improved	  the	  success	  of	  their	  vaccine	  campaigns	  by	  personalizing	  
the	  campaigns	  to	  their	  populations.	  As	  illustrated	  by	  Montana	  and	  New	  Mexico,	  acting	  
independently	  of	  the	  CDC,	  or	  going	  above	  and	  beyond	  national	  guidelines,	  was	  sometimes	  a	  
good	  thing.	  Both	  states	  spent	  energy	  to	  repackage	  the	  vaccine	  into	  smaller	  shipments	  to	  
accommodate	  their	  populations,	  a	  measure	  which	  worked	  to	  ensure	  that	  at	  least	  some	  vaccine	  
was	  received	  by	  all	  providers.	  States	  that	  had	  run	  seasonal	  flu	  vaccine	  campaigns	  prior	  to	  2009	  
were	  also	  more	  prepared	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  vaccine	  necessitated	  by	  the	  H1N1	  Pandemic.	  	  	  
	   Therefore,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  vaccine	  management	  for	  future	  pandemics	  could	  be	  
improved	  by	  taking	  specific	  actions	  now:	  practicing	  vaccine	  distribution	  at	  a	  local	  scale	  during	  
annual	  waves	  of	  seasonal	  flu	  and	  preferring	  population-­‐based	  distribution	  during	  times	  of	  high	  
demand,	  low	  supply	  and	  online	  ordering	  distribution	  otherwise.	  
	  
Conclusion:	  Next	  Steps	  
	  
Without	  the	  existence	  of	  pandemic	  preparedness	  plans	  which	  matched	  the	  vaccine	  
supply	  scenario	  met	  during	  the	  2009	  H1N1	  Pandemic,	  states	  struggled	  with	  distributing	  vaccine	  
to	  their	  populations	  before	  interest	  in	  the	  vaccine	  waned.	  By	  surveying	  the	  After	  Action	  Reports	  
of	  fourteen	  states,	  reasons	  for	  the	  inequitable	  and	  slow	  administration	  of	  the	  H1N1	  vaccine	  
during	  the	  fall	  influenza	  wave	  were	  readily	  identified	  as	  communication	  issues	  between	  the	  
national	  and	  state	  healthcare	  systems	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  practice	  with	  vaccine	  distribution	  systems	  
in	  several	  states.	  Despite	  these	  issues,	  the	  AARs	  of	  some	  states	  indicate	  these	  were	  more	  
successful	  than	  others	  with	  their	  vaccine	  campaigns.	  Thus	  the	  AARs	  further	  show	  that	  the	  
distribution	  system	  of	  vaccine	  within	  a	  state	  was	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  healthcare	  
professionals	  to	  administer	  what	  little	  vaccine	  there	  was	  to	  target	  populations.	  	  Indeed,	  
distribution	  by	  population	  appeared	  to	  be	  less	  frustrating	  and	  more	  productive	  than	  the	  most	  
popular	  distribution	  method	  used	  by	  states:	  online	  ordering.	  
All	  of	  the	  aspects	  of	  vaccine	  distribution,	  however,	  reduce	  to	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  
pandemic	  preparedness	  needs	  to	  be	  better	  in	  the	  future.	  These	  reports	  suggest	  that	  the	  best	  
method	  is	  not	  a	  written	  plan	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  useful.	  The	  best	  method	  is	  a	  
plan	  which	  includes	  the	  following:	  
• A	  vaccine	  distribution	  system	  based	  on	  population	  for	  periods	  of	  low	  vaccine	  supply	  
• Likewise,	  a	  vaccine	  distribution	  system	  based	  on	  an	  online	  ordering	  website	  for	  periods	  
of	  sufficient	  vaccine	  supply	  	  
• Thorough	  testing	  of	  both	  systems	  	  
In	  any	  distribution	  network,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  test	  the	  nodes	  such	  as	  an	  ordering	  system.	  
These	  nodes	  need	  to	  work	  efficiently	  in	  order	  for	  vaccine	  get	  where	  it	  is	  most	  needed,	  ideally	  
equitably	  but	  at	  least	  using	  a	  system	  that	  can	  be	  readily	  explained	  to	  local	  healthcare	  
departments	  and	  other	  providers.	  Testing	  a	  system	  for	  attributes	  such	  as	  ease-­‐of-­‐use	  and	  
clarity	  would	  also	  not	  be	  too	  difficult;	  it	  would	  require	  a	  series	  of	  vaccine	  providers	  giving	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feedback	  on	  a	  test	  run	  of	  the	  system.	  In	  short,	  paper	  plans	  like	  the	  ones	  made	  in	  2005	  are	  not	  
sufficient;	  in	  order	  to	  be	  ready	  for	  the	  next	  pandemic	  of	  any	  scale,	  states	  need	  to	  make	  sure	  
their	  systems	  work.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Though	  a	  single	  AAR	  supplies	  only	  the	  voice	  of	  a	  state	  and	  a	  sample	  size	  of	  the	  
healthcare	  industry	  within	  that	  state,	  there	  is	  value	  in	  examining	  all	  of	  them	  to	  determine	  
measures	  which	  can	  be	  taken	  now	  to	  avoid	  similar	  frustration	  in	  future	  pandemics.	  Since	  this	  
paper	  analyzed	  fourteen	  such	  reports	  in	  parallel,	  the	  conclusions	  drawn	  about	  the	  common	  
issues	  faced	  by	  states	  cannot	  be	  lightly	  dismissed,	  even	  if	  a	  single	  opinion	  in	  a	  single	  report	  
might	  be	  debatable.	  In	  sum,	  these	  AARs	  provide	  a	  compelling	  picture	  of	  the	  significant	  
frustration	  and	  inefficiencies	  confronting	  every	  healthcare	  professional	  on	  every	  level	  of	  
vaccine	  distribution,	  beginning	  with	  the	  manufacturers	  and	  ending	  with	  the	  civilian	  attempting	  
to	  get	  inoculated	  against	  the	  H1N1	  virus.	  	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Summary	  of	  State	  Vaccine	  Distribution	  	  
State	  Name	   Initial	  
Distribution	  
Method	  
Strategies	  for	  Distribution	   Concerns	  of	  Vaccine	  Campaign	  
Alaska	   Risk	  group	  
population	  
Alaska’s	  Department	  of	  Health	  
and	  Social	  Services	  coordinated	  
the	  distribution	  from	  a	  central	  
repository	  (warehouse).	  
Initially	  shipped	  to	  providers	  
based	  on	  population;	  switched	  
to	  an	  online	  order	  system	  once	  
levels	  of	  vaccine	  were	  high	  
enough.	  
Nothing	  significant.	  Alaska	  had	  
to	  manage	  some	  hotspots	  of	  
influenza	  activity	  (a	  school	  with	  
high	  rates	  of	  absenteeism,	  for	  
instance)	  but	  dealt	  with	  these	  
situations	  as	  they	  arose.	  	  
California	   Online	  
ordering	  
Local	  health	  departments	  and	  
other	  providers	  were	  
responsible	  for	  storing	  and	  
dispensing	  vaccine	  once	  
receiving	  it	  from	  the	  state	  
health	  department.	  
Anticipated	  a	  slower	  spread	  of	  
the	  pandemic	  and	  a	  more	  lethal	  
virus;	  as	  a	  result,	  preparedness	  
plan	  was	  not	  used.	  
Confusion	  over	  the	  online	  
ordering	  system’s	  “request”	  
versus	  “order”	  of	  vaccine	  
resulting	  in	  inequitable	  
partitioning	  of	  vaccine	  to	  
providers.	  
Delaware	   Online	  
ordering	  
Prioritized	  vaccination	  of	  
schoolchildren	  to	  deal	  with	  
initial	  supply	  of	  LAIV	  vaccine.	  
The	  vaccine	  ordering	  system	  
was	  multi-­‐step	  and	  difficult	  to	  
navigate	  for	  several	  providers.	  
Orders	  were	  not	  easy	  to	  track	  
and	  “requesting”	  versus	  
“ordering”	  vaccine	  was	  a	  point	  




Massachusetts	   Online	  
ordering	  
Providers	  merged	  or	  divided	  to	  
navigate	  vaccine	  ordering	  
system;	  no	  direction	  as	  to	  how	  
to	  determine	  order	  amount	  
Vaccine	  clinics	  had	  to	  be	  shut	  
down	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  vaccine.	  	  
Providers	  stockpiled	  vaccine	  
until	  they	  had	  enough	  to	  
distribute.	  	  
Montana	   Population	   Repackaged	  vaccine	  from	  
manufacturers	  into	  smaller	  
aliquots	  for	  rural	  populations.	  
Ensured	  a	  baseline	  amount	  of	  
vaccine	  distributed	  to	  all	  
population	  groups.	  
Labor	  intensive	  to	  repackage	  
vaccine	  and	  track	  vaccine	  
distribution.	  
New	  Jersey	   Preconceived	  
population	  




“H1N1	  Vaccine	  System”	  
responsible	  for	  tracking	  and	  
allocating	  vaccine.	  
Lack	  of	  transparency	  in	  the	  
distribution	  method	  and	  the	  
ordering	  process	  for	  providers.	  
Some	  vaccine	  doses	  bypassed	  
local	  health	  departments	  and	  
were	  distributed	  at	  companies	  
such	  as	  Goldman	  Sachs.	  
Providers	  perceived	  inequitable	  
distribution	  of	  vaccine.	  
New	  Mexico	   Risk	  group	  
population	  
Repackaged	  vaccine	  into	  
smaller	  aliquots	  to	  distribute	  to	  
providers.	  Larger	  providers	  
received	  vaccine	  directly	  from	  
manufacturers,	  smaller	  
providers	  from	  the	  state	  health	  
department.	  Utilized	  seasonal	  
flu	  distribution	  plans	  to	  help	  
with	  coordination	  of	  vaccine	  
campaign.	  Refined	  risk	  group	  
designations	  independently	  of	  
the	  CDC	  to	  better	  
accommodate	  the	  vaccine	  
shortage.	  
Cancellations	  of	  scheduled	  
vaccine	  distribution	  clinics	  were	  
common	  in	  the	  first	  few	  weeks	  
of	  distribution.	  	  
Nevada	   Algorithm	  for	  
distribution	  
State	  Immunization	  Program	  
shipped	  to	  small,	  private	  
providers	  and	  local	  health	  
departments.	  LHDs	  distributed	  
among	  their	  county’s	  
providers.	  
Algorithm	  did	  not	  handle	  the	  
initial	  vaccine	  shortage	  well.	  The	  
state	  health	  department	  
decided	  to	  distribute	  vaccine	  
based	  on	  speed	  of	  
administration	  instead.	  The	  
many	  levels	  of	  distribution	  and	  
autonomy	  between	  the	  levels	  
were	  causes	  of	  confusion	  and	  
some	  communication	  failures	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regarding	  the	  status	  of	  vaccine	  
administration	  across	  the	  state.	  
North	  Dakota	   Online	  
ordering	  
Distribution	  sites	  coordinated	  
at	  the	  local	  level	  but	  the	  state	  
health	  department	  was	  primary	  
vaccine	  provider	  within	  the	  
state.	  
Vaccine	  ordering	  system	  cited	  
to	  be	  in	  need	  of	  improvement,	  
though	  no	  further	  details	  are	  
provided	  in	  the	  AAR.	  	  
Ohio	   Online	  
ordering	  
Distributed	  to	  local	  health	  
departments,	  and	  from	  there	  
to	  providers.	  	  
Vaccine	  management	  was	  
performed	  by	  a	  designated	  
“Vaccine	  Group.”	  Often	  
understaffed.	  
“Vaccine	  Group”	  was	  often	  
overwhelmed	  by	  need	  and	  lack	  
of	  supply.	  
“Pre-­‐registration”	  versus	  
“registration”	  of	  online	  ordering	  
was	  a	  roadblock	  for	  providers	  
ordering	  vaccine.	  
Online	  system	  often	  incorrectly	  
processed	  vaccine	  orders.	  	  
Rhode	  Island	   Population	   Utilized	  a	  preconceived	  
“Medical	  Emergency	  
Distribution	  System”	  to	  handle	  
the	  logistics	  of	  distributing	  and	  
administering	  vaccine.	  
Deliveries	  were	  made	  daily	  
from	  a	  central	  warehouse;	  
unused	  vaccine	  was	  returned	  
at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day.	  
Nothing	  significant	  reported	  in	  
the	  AAR.	  Highest	  vaccination	  
rate	  (38.8%)	  in	  the	  country.	  
Vermont	   Online	  
ordering	  
Attempted	  to	  motivate	  
distribution	  based	  on	  
population,	  but	  still	  used	  an	  
online	  ordering	  system	  to	  
connect	  with	  providers.	  	  
Difficulties	  in	  scheduling	  clinics	  
around	  vaccine	  arrivals	  due	  to	  
erratic	  distribution	  from	  the	  
state	  health	  department	  and	  
the	  vaccine	  manufacturers.	  
Online	  ordering	  system	  caused	  
difficulties	  in	  ordering	  and	  
tracking	  vaccine.	  
Virginia	   Online	  
ordering	  
State	  health	  department	  
distributed	  vaccine	  to	  providers	  
Advertised	  vaccine	  
administration	  clinics	  too	  early,	  
before	  vaccine	  was	  received.	  
Wisconsin	   Online	  
ordering	  
Providers	  in	  the	  state	  received	  
vaccine	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  
sources,	  including	  local	  health	  
departments,	  the	  vaccine	  
manufacturers,	  and	  hospital	  
pharmacies.	  
Confusion	  between	  the	  
“request”	  for	  vaccines	  and	  the	  
“order”	  of	  a	  vaccine	  shipment	  in	  
the	  online	  system.	  Many	  
providers	  believed	  distribution	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